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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF EPHRAIM, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

:
:

vs.
•

HALBERT DAVIS, STEVIE KAY
STEINMANN, BABYLON CORPORATION, PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL
SAVINGS, FIRST STATE BANK,
THE UTAH TAX COMMISSION, and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Case No. 14514
:
:

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
BABYLON CORPORATION

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant Bank of Ephraim appeals from a decision
of the Sixth Judicial District Court as to the priorities
of certain judgment creditors on a Judgment and Decree of
Foreclosure.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court awarded judgment on a Decree of
Foreclosure to the judgment creditors, Bank of Ephraim,
Babylon Corporation, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association and the Utah State Tax Commission, as per the
complaints of each creditor.

The rights of the defendant

Steinraann were previously assigned to defendant Babylon
Corporation.

The defendants, First State Bank and United

1.

States of America, were previously dismissed as parties
defendant to the action.
In its Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, the District
Court, in addition to awarding judgments to the judgment
creditors, assigned priorities to the judgments of each
creditor, as set forth in the appellant's Statement of Facts.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to sustain the entry of judgment and
priorities as set forth in the court below*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the issues raised in this appeal, respondent substantially accepts the Statement of Facts of
appellant, with several clarifications and additions as follows :
1.

Appellee Babylon Corporation has interest only in

the cafe property.

Babylon Corporation obtained this interest

by assignment from Steven Kaye Steinmann.
2.

The mortgage that Halbert Davis gave to Steinmann was

given the same day that the Bank of Ephraim note was given
August 7, 1970.
3.

—

(See defendant's Exhibit #5).

The Steinmann mortgage was recorded after the Bank of

Ephraim mortgage, but on the same day - August 10, 1970.
defendant's Exhibit #3).

(See

At the time of the recordation of

the Steinmann mortgage, the Bank of Ephraim had advanced only
$2400.00 on the Bank of Ephraim note.

Any monies advanced by

the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property over and above $2400.00

2.

were advanced after the recordation of the Steinmann mortgage,
and were purely optional.
4#

(Appellant's Brief, p. 9).

The Steinmann mortgage was recorded at the request

of Tibbs & Tervort, who then were counsel for the appellant,
Bank of Ephraim.

(See defendant's Exhibit #3).

The fact that

the deed was prepared by the escrow department of the Bank of
Ephraim, and was recorded at the request of counsel for the
appellant is important in establishing that as of August 10,
1970, the appellant had actual notice of the Steinmann mortgage.
5.

As stated by the appellant, "the mortgage to Steven

Kaye Steinmann expressly sets forth the fact that it was
secondary to the mortgage of the Bank 6f Ephraim."

What the

appellant failed to mention is that th£ Steinmann mortgage
expressly sets forth that it be second in lien priority to the
Bank of Ephraim mortgage iri the amount of $2400.00.

(Defen-

dant's Exhibit #3) .
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
APPELLANT BANK OF EPHRAIM HAS NO BASIS
IN LAW OR IN FACT FOR ITS APPEAL AGAINST
THE APPELLEE, BABYLON CORPORATION.
Throughout its arguments, appellant addresses itself to
appellee Prudential Federal Savings, and only in the closing
one-half page is Babylon Corporation even mentioned.

Appellant

would have the Court believe that the facts of the Babylon
mortgage are in relevant parts similar to the facts of the
Prudential mortgage.

Such is not the case.

The Babylon mort-

gage differs from the Prudential mortgage in two very important

3.

respects.

First, the Bank of Ephraim had actual notice of

the Babylon mortgage, and thus was put on notice of a lien
superior to its future optional advances.

Se>cond, all ad-

vances made by the Bank of Ephraim on the cafe property were
made after the giving of the Steinmann mortgage.

As will be

pointed out below, these two fact differences render inapplicable all of the appellant's arguments as appellant would
have the Court apply them to Babylon Corporation.

Indeed,

the cases cited by the appellant support conclusively the
position of the appellee, Babylon Corporation.
POINT II
BECAUSE THE BANK OF EPHRAIM HAD ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE BABYLON MORTGAGE, AND ALL
OF THE APPELLANT'S ADVANCES WERE MADE
AFTER THE RECORDATION OF THE BABYLON
MORTGAGE, THE BABYLON LIEN HAS PRIORITY
OVER ANY MONIES OPTIONALLY ADVANCED BY
THE BANK OF EPHRAIM.
The appellant has admitted from the beginning that the
advances made by the Bank of Ephraim were optional and not
obligatory under the mortgage.

(Appellantfs Brief, p. 9 ) .

Authority almost universally advises that such advances, when
given after notice of subsequent interests, do not have
priority over such subsequent interests.

The universal rule

is quoted quite succinctly in Leche v. Ponca City Production
Credit Association, 478 P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1970):
"The applicable rule of law is stated in
36 Am. Jur., Mortgages, §234: 'The greater
array of authority, however, is found on
the side of the doctrine that advances
made after notice of subsequent interests

4.

do not have priority over such interests. This rule has been applied to
subsequent liens and encumbrances as
well as to subsequent grants of the
property. The mere specification in
the senior mortgage that the further
advances are not to exceed a fixed sum
does not vary the rule. The Irule is
especially applicable where the advancements are optional with the
mortgagee...1
In 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, §230, at 299,
the rule is stated: 'In accordance
with the general rule, after notice of
the attaching of a junior lien, the
senior mortgagee ordinarily will not be
protected in making further advances
under his mortgage given to secure such
advances, at least where he v^as under
no binding engagement to mak^ such advances. ' "
The above cited case is not a materials men case, yet it
does come down strongly to support Babylon's position.
Other courts almost universally a|ree.

In Kimmel v. Batty,

168 Colo. 431, 451 P.2d 751, 753 (1969), the Supreme Court of
Colorado approves of the rule that "..fif it is optional with
the mortgagee to make or refuse the advances, he will be protected by the security of his mortgage)only as to the advances
made before the attaching of the juniojr lien or encumbrance."
(emphasis added).
The Supreme Court of Washington, jln National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors,

81 Wash.2d 886, 506 P.2d 20, 29

(1973), also strongly agrees:
"Thus, we are adhering to wh^t we perceive to be the weight of authority...
Optional advances under a construction
loan agreement attach when the advances

5.

are actually made. Any liens attaching prior to an optional advance would
thus be superior to it, and attaching
afterwards, junior to it."
The Idaho Supreme Court has also come down on point:
"A senior mortgage for future advances
will maintain seniority for advances
made after actual notice of a junior
lien if, but only if, there was a contractual obligation to make such advances existing prior to the notice of
the junior lien." Biersdorff v. Brumfield, 93 Ida. 569, 468 P.2d 301, 302
(1970) .
The appellant cites Savings & Loan Society v. Burnett,
106 Cal. 514, 39 P. 922, 926 (1895) as being controlling.
that case, quoting from Tapia v. Demartini,

In

77 Cal. 387, 19 P.

641 (1888), the California Court states:
"But the lien of the mortgage cannot
be enforced against subsequent encumbrances, of which the mortgagee has
actual notice for advances or endorsements made or given after such notice."
A review of other cases cited by the appellant indicate
that Iowa, Indiana and Alabama, as well as virtually all other
jurisdictions, support the position that optional advances of
a prior lienholder, after that prior lienholder has been given
notice of subsequent interests, do not have priority over said
subsequent interests.

(See Everist v. Carter, 202 Iowa 498,

210 NW 559 (1926); Corn Belt Trust & Savings Bank of Belle
Plaine v. May,
Zahrndt,

197 Iowa 54, 196 NW 735 (1924); Schmidt v.

148 Ind. 447, 47 NE 335, 337 (1897); Farmers Union

Warehouse Co. v. Barnett Bros.,

273 Ala. 435, 137 So. 176

(1931); Elmendorf-Anthony Co. v. Dunn,
253, 255 (1941)).

6.

10 Wa.2d 29, 116 P.2d

In reaching this rule of law, the courts have followed
good sound reasoning and policy.

If the courts allowed a

first mortgage holder to make optional advances with priority
ad infinitum, even after receiving notice of a second mortgageholder's interest, it would spell the death of the second
mortgage.

In the instant case, it should be obvious to the

Court that the Babylon-Steinmann mortgage would not have been
accepted for security if Steinmann had known that the Bank of
Ephraim would attempt to take priority on all future optional
advances, totally contrary to the law.

The appellant Bank of

Ephraim indicates that any future lienholders have the responsibility of ascertaining the true amount of indebtedness
outstanding at the time that the second mortgage is put into
effect - even when the amount cannot be determined from the
face of the mortgage (Appellant's Brief, p. 11). This is
true, and Steinmann took all possible steps to protect herself, by indicating that her mortgage was second to that of
the Bank of Ephraim JLri the amount of $2400.00.
amount already advanced).

(The exact

Bank of Ephraim, being the escrow

agent in the Steinmann transaction, had actual notice of the
above restriction.

Therefore, in law and in policy, Bank

of Ephraim should not receive priority over Steinmann-Babylon
for any monies advanced after notice and recordation of the
Steinmann-Babylon mortgage.

)

The Court will note that the above panoply of law indicates
that the Babylon Corporation should receive priority for all
amounts over the $2400.00 already advanced at the time of the

7.

Steinmann-Babylon mortgage, rather than amounts over $3000.00,
as decided in the court below.

Although Babylon Corporation

did raise this point in the court below, it has not preferred
this point as a grounds for appeal and, therefore, does not
ask for reversal of the lower court's judgment*
POINT III
THE INCLUSION IN THE BANK OF EPHRAIM
MORTGAGE OF THE TYPEWRITTEN PHRASE
"THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED
$3000.00" LIMITS THE BANK'S PRIORITY
AND RECOVERY ON THE MORTGAGE TO
$3000.00.
Although the multiplicity of authority under Point II
should suffice to obtain the results for which the appellee,
Babylon Corporation, asks, there is also solid authority which
indicates that the $3000.00 limitation typed onto the Bank of
Ephraim mortgage also may be conclusive.
Appellant contends that the printed word in paragraph 2
of the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, wherein it states "and for
all of which this mortgage shall stand as a continuing security
until paid" should supercede the large typed statement that
"this mortgage covers all additional advances on this loan,
the total principal amount not to exceed $3000.00."

The

typed statement is obviously a limitation on the mortgage
security, and is irreconcilable with any statements which would
allow unlimited security.
The Bank of Ephraim mortgage was prepared by the appellant, and thus should be construed most strongly against it:
"... In case of uncertainty as to the
meaning of a contract, it should be
construed most strictly against its
framer..." (Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 16
U.2d 323, 400 "P.2d 503 (1965)).
8.

Additionally,
"Where there is a printed form of a
contract, and other words are inserted,
in writing or otherwise, it is to be
assumed that they take precedence over
the printed matter." (Holland v. Brown,
15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77, 78 (1964)).
In the same light, Steven Kaye Steinmann was justified,
when reviewing the Bank of Ephraim mortgage, to believe that
the written (typed) word would take precedence over any ambiguous printed statements. A mortgage cannot be both "for
any other indebtedness at any time existing from the mortgagor
to the mortgagee," and limited in principal amount "not to
exceed $3000.00," unless the total debt outstanding is always
$3000.00 or less.

Because of the typed clause in the instant

case, once the principal amount reaches $3000.00, any additional advances would not be secured under the mortgage.
A fine Utah case in point is General Mills, Inc. v.
Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943), in which a unanimous decision was rendered, and has stood the test of time of .
over 33 years.

In the General Mills case, there was a chattel

mortgage securing the mortgagors f obligation to pay for turkey
feed, drawn by the mortgagee.

That mortgage contained two

clauses which are amazingly similar to the clauses in question
in the instant case.

First, in the body of the printed mort-

gage, it is stated that the mortgage was security for "all
Dther sums now or hereafter due or owing from the mortgagors
to the mortgagee."

Closely following was the limit "provided,

however, that the maximum amount, the payment of which is to

9.

be secured hereby, is $3750.00.f5

The court decided that both

clauses could not be operative; that there was an irreconcilable ambiguj-^y, and therefore rules of construction and intent
were to be followed.

Quoting from the text of the opinion at

page 1093:
"It is so eleirentary that an ambiguity
in a written instrument is construed more
strongly against the party who drew the
instrument that citation of authorities
should be unnecessary. This is especially
so where the one drafting the instrument
has the advantage of a. lender of money."
(emphasis added).
After a thorough consideration of lav/ and policy, the
court finally stated, at 1094, that:
"We are constrained to hold from a consideration of the language of the contract in its entirety, the contract res
and the relation of the parties to each
other, that the parties intended by their
agreement to enter into a chattel mortgage to secure the sum of not to exceed
$3750.00 by a lien. .
The similarities in the two cases are striking.
involved mortgages.
mortgage papers.

Both cases

In both cases the mortgagee prepared the

Both cases have an

as well as a 'limiting' clause.

!

unlimited1 security clause,

The law in Utah is clear.

Wher<=

there is a limiting clause in a mortgage, "the mortgage involved
is in fact for an liquidated amount with a maximum..."

(General

Mills, supra, at 1093) .
As applied to the case at bar, the General Mills case
clearly indicates that any priorities that, the

appellant Bank

of Ephraim could have on tne secured cafe property step at
$3000.00, as indicated on the fact of the mortgage.

To grant

more would be going against at least 33 years of clear-cut Utah
10.

law, as well as policy which dictates that ambiguities in
written instruments (and in particular, recorded instruments
designed to give notice) should be construed most strongly
against the preparer of the instrument.
CONCLUSION
The appellant argues almost exclusively against Prudential Federal Savings, and never comes on point against the
appellee Babylon Corporation.

As extensively cited in Point

II, the universal rule is that advances given after notice
of subsequent interests do not have priority over such subsequent interest.

Finally, the $3000.00 express limit as

typed onto the face of the mortgage limits any priorities of
the Bank of Ephraim under the mortgage of $3000.00.

Both ex-

tensive law and common sense policy dictate that the judgment
of the lower court should be affirmed in its entirety as it
applies to the appellee Babylon Corporation.

Respectfully submitted,

S. IR&x LfeVi-s^^for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent Babylon Corporati
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601
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foregoing Brief to Louis G. Tervort, Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant, 50 North Main, Manti, Utah 84642, and to Wayne G.
Petty, Moyle & Draper, Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings & Loan, No. 15 East First South, Salt Lcike City, Utah
84111, and to Bruce M. Hall, Assistant Attorney General,
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to
Udell R. Jensen, Attorney for Halbert Davis, 125 South Main,
Nephi, Utah 84648, this 6th day of August, 1976.
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